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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

- The main weakness of Polish economy today is the uneveness of performance of various branches of industry in executing the different production plans.

 The result is a constant accumulation of stocks of various items, which cannot be absorbed by the industries for which they are destined, and act therefore as a form of bottleneck. The government is perfectly aware of this danger and has given priority to the removal of residual stocks.
 - 2. Furthermore, it should be stated that production figures, particularly when expressed in the form of value of production rather than quantities of output, are fabricated and therefore misleading. Even in the case of quantitative output, the procedure is normally to produce the requisite weight of output by the end of the year, without regard to its future use, merely to be able to send in the right figures.
 - A general lack of spare parts is characteristic of industry today. It is almost as if this was a deliberate policy on the part of the Russians to create a situation of complete dependence of Polish industry on the USSR, even from the technical standpoint. In many cases, technicians have had to be sent from the USSR to effect repairs, because the Russian authorities refused otherwise to send the necessary spares. In fact, the repairs have had to await the arrival of these technicians, because the Russians refused to allow the technicians of the factory concerned to carry them out.
 - Those branches of Polish industry, working almost exclusively on war contracts, produce in the first place semi-finished items of machinery and equipment required for the manufacture of war material rather than the armaments themselves. There is, properly speaking, no pure armaments industry in Poland today.
 - 5. The one or two aircraft factories in existence are equipped primarily to effect repairs, and not to produce aircraft. The same situation applies to

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arms and ammunition factories. Nearly all ammunition is imported from the USSR; very little is produced in Poland.

- 6. Even in the case of works such as the Ursus tractor plant near Warsaw, which could easily switch over to truck production, the completed article could not be assembled because certain vital parts are made only in the USSR. Civilian firms which collaborate closely with the Army, such as the automobile factory at Zeran, produce very few items for the home market. The cars, which have been produced for propaganda purposes at Zeran, need certain imported parts from the USSR before they can be assembled. The bulk of production at Zeran is assembled under Soviet direction either in the USSR or on the spot.
- 7. Soviet policy appears to be afraid of allowing Poland to have her own fully equipped armaments industry, due to the possibility of having to leave Polish territory. In this case the industry might work against them.
- 8. The great weakness of the industrial economy of the Soviet bloc as a whole is the shortage of non-ferrous metals. Soviet officials have repeatedly given the Poles the impression that the situation is desperate by the manner in which they have insisted on the purchase of minute quantities.
- 9. Steel products also do not appear to have reached the required level. This seems to be due to the inadequate reconstruction of the Ukrainian industries. For this reason, it is apparent to Polish technicians that the expansion of the Polish and Czech steel industries in the Silesian area has been forced abnormally. Labor and raw materials are close at hand in this area.
- 10. The Polish steel factories, however, are working badly and production plans have not been fulfilled. This applies to the old works as well as to the new factories such as Nowa Huta near Krakow, and the newly re-equipped works, such as the Kosciuszko works in Upper Silesia.
- 11. The emphasis has, therefore, recently turned to Czechoslovakia. Polish deliveries of dolomite from Szczakowa to Czechoslovakia have been increased during the first quarter of 1952.
- 12. The extraction of momazite sand (piaski monacytowe) is proceeding at Kamienna Gora (Lower Silesia). Soviet specialists and experts are directing this, but the work seems to be proceeding unsatisfactorily.

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